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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
 ffective international criminal regulation of autonomous weapon sys-
tems (AWS) faces two conceptual obstacles.1 The first is deeply philosophi-
                                                                                                                      
 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; 
jdo43@cornell.edu. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of 
the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College. 
1. For an introduction to the basic challenges raised by autonomous weapon systems 
(AWS), see generally Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autono-
mous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOUR-
NAL 231, 233 (2013) (“whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be 
prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a 
manner that runs contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the 
‘conduct of hostilities’”); Michael A. Newton, Back to the Future: Reflections on the Advent of 
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cal: when might an autonomous system be sufficiently self-aware that it 
could be held criminally liable as a morally responsible agent?2 The second 
issue is far more urgent: When could a military commander be held crimi-
nally responsible for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) per-
petrated by an autonomous weapon system? I argue in this article that the 
answer to the second question is logically independent from the first. 
Although the literature on AWS is new,3 the basic framework for AWS 
liability was outlined, in nascent form, at Nuremberg and its aftermath. 
Although this sounds unlikely, a close reading of international criminal 
law’s infancy shows that modes of liability were designed for convicting 
those who indirectly perpetrate war crimes through a “machine” or orga-
nized “apparatus” of power.4 Indeed, the whole narrative of post-
                                                                                                                      
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5, 8 (2015). 
2. In asking this question, I am referring to a fully autonomous weapon system. How-
ever, many of these issues are also raised with regard to semi-autonomous systems. Re-
garding the distinction between different levels of autonomy in a weapon system, see U.S. 
Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Nov. 2, 
2012), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf. For analysis of this 
directive, see U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Directive on Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 681 (2013). 
3. In particular, some human rights organizations have strongly criticized the devel-
opment of AWS on the basis that these systems will increase—rather than decrease—the 
number of violations of IHL. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE 
CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/ los-
ing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots. Although this is an important debate, my argu-
ment in this article does not depend on either the acceptance or rejection of this critique. 
See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical Requirement 
That Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: 
CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 224 
(Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-making, 94 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012); Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability 
of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787 (2012); 
WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, CONFLICT LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOL-
OGY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMERGING ACTORS 148 (2014). 
4. Criminal liability is not the only mode of responsibility that could be applied to 
AWS. Some scholars have argued that private remedies in tort law may be especially help-
ful in regulating AWS. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer Robots, 40 
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & COMMERCIAL REGULATION 909, 
932 (2015) (arguing that “for example, who will be held liable for a war crime committed 
by an autonomous weapon system? The weapon system itself? Its deployer? His or her 
commander? Its programmer? Its manufacturer? Will this be a question of international 
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Nuremberg international criminal law involves individuals who were mere 
“cogs in a machine.”5 Although this language was once deployed as a met-
aphor to refer to human “machine-like” organizations, the technical re-
quirements for liability under these legal doctrines map on surprisingly well 
to the indirect perpetration of war crimes through an AWS. In particular, 
international criminal law, following several domestic systems, abandoned 
the “innocent instrumentality rule,” thus paving the way for prosecuting 
individuals for indirectly perpetrating an international crime even if the “in-
strument” of their criminality is also a morally culpable agent.6 This is an 
important development because I also argue in this article that combatants 
on the battlefield would be required by the demands of behavior interpreta-
tion to approach a sophisticated AWS with what I call the “combatant’s 
stance”—the ascription of mental states required to understand the system’s 
strategic behavior on the battlefield. However, military commanders can be 
held responsible for perpetrating war crimes through an AWS regardless of 
the moral status of the AWS as a culpable or non-culpable agent. In other 
words, a military commander can be liable for the acts of the machine in-
dependent of what conclusions we draw from the fact that combatants—
even artificial ones—must approach each other with the combatant’s 
stance. 
However, there is still one jurisprudential area where international 
criminal law is ill-suited to prosecuting AWS cases, and that involves the 
mental state of recklessness. Many AWS cases will involve commanders 
who are reckless in deploying an AWS that launches attacks that violate the 
core prohibitions of IHL. Unfortunately, international criminal law’s treat-
ment of crimes of recklessness remains wholly inadequate, mostly because 
there is no international equivalent to manslaughter or a similar crime that 
meets any reasonable standard of fair labeling. These problems will need to 
be solved before international criminal law can generate a responsible legal 
regime for holding military commanders responsible for recklessly perpe-
trating a war crime through an autonomous weapon system. 
                                                                                                                      
criminal law, or rather some form of international products liability tort?”); Rebecca 
Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW (forthcoming) (proposing that war torts would fill the gap left over from 
criminal regulation because international criminal law is often unwilling to impose liability 
based on mere negligence). However, the present article will focus on forms of criminal 
responsibility. 
5. See infra notes 23–38 and related text. 
6. See infra notes 43–53 and related text. 
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II.  “COGS IN THE MACHINE” AND OTHER METAPHORS 
 
During the Nuremberg era, it was not uncommon for lawyers to talk of a 
machine-like organization that collectively perpetrated an international 
crime. Consider the Borkum Island case, which involved a U.S. warplane 
(Flying Fortress) that was shot down over the German island of Borkum in 
1944.7 The crewmembers that survived the crash were taken prisoner by 
the German army and were forced to march through local streets as they 
suffered various beatings and other forms of mistreatment.8 Members of 
the German military perpetrated some of the beatings, but local civilians 
perpetrated other beatings after their mayor urged his constituents to attack 
the prisoners. The entire incident ended with the prisoners being shot and 
killed at the local city hall.9 
Several of the perpetrators were prosecuted for their involvement in 
the crime before a U.S. military court that was convened right after the war. 
In a description that would later become influential for the subsequent de-
velopment of international criminal law, the prosecutor in the case referred 
to the perpetrators as “cogs in the wheel of common design, all equally im-
portant, each cog doing the part assigned to it. And the wheel of wholesale 
murder could not turn without all the cogs.”10 At least part of the impetus 
for using the machine metaphor was that the prosecutor was unable to as-
sign individualized blame for particular results, since so many individuals 
had participated in the beatings and mistreatment that eventually resulted 
in the final murders of the airmen.11 However, in addition to this eviden-
tiary issue, there was also a greater inspiration: the idea of collective action, 
                                                                                                                      
7. See United States v. Goebell et al. (Borkum Island), U.S. Military Commission, Case 
No 12–489 (1946) (microformed on 1–6 Records of United States Army War Crimes Tri-
als, M1103 Rolls 1–7, National Archives Microfilm Publications (1980)). 
8. For an extensive discussion of the case, see Robert Charles Clarke, Return to Borkum 
Island: Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise Responsibility in the Wake of World War II, 9 JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE  839 (2011). 
9. Id. 
10. This quote from Borkum Island was cited with approval in Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 210 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeal Judgment]. 
11. Id. See also id., ¶ 208, discussing the same point with reference to the Essen Lynching 
Case (Trial of Erich Heyer and six others) before the British Military Court for the Trial of 
War Criminals. 
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i.e. that multiple individuals might combine together to form a group agent 
capable of collectively carrying out truly horrific crimes.12 
Indeed, this phenomenon was part of the entire psychology of the 
Holocaust. While some members of the German government (including 
the High Command) were directly involved in all aspects of the Holocaust, 
many of the individual perpetrators were only involved in discrete and iso-
lated parts of the enterprise.13 Perhaps this was essential to their coopera-
tion in the endeavor. Although they knew that what they were doing was 
wrong, they rationalized their behavior with the belief that they were only 
responsible for the small contribution that they were making to the effort, 
such as being a guard in a concentration camp or perpetrating some other 
persecution against Jews. However, the aggregation of these individual acts 
of criminality combined together to produce a massive criminal enterprise 
that collectively perpetrated the Holocaust. Moreover, the collective en-
deavor was no act of mere parallelism. It was coordinated to devastating 
effect by higher command officials who designed the larger “system” so as 
to maximize efficiency through a division of labor. 
It is precisely for these reasons that the Holocaust and other interna-
tional crimes are often referred to with the language of a system or “ma-
chine.”14 The metaphor shows up in other cases as well. For example, in 
the Ponzano case, the military prosecutor noted that the defendant was re-
sponsible under common law principles for setting in motion a chain of 
events that were the natural and probable consequences of his actions.15 
Specifically, the argument was that “if these men . . . set the machinery in 
                                                                                                                      
12. For a discussion of this issue, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 202 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the need to “protect society against persons who (i) 
band together to take part in criminal enterprises; and (ii) while not sharing the criminal 
intent of those participants who intend to commit more serious crimes outside the com-
mon enterprise, nevertheless are aware that such crimes may be committed; and (iii) do 
not oppose or prevent them”). 
13. On division of labor in criminal endeavors, see generally MICHAEL BOHLANDER, 
PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 163 (2009); ROBERT CRYER, ‎HÅKAN FRI-
MAN, ‎DARRYL ROBINSON, & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2014). 
14. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 CO-
LUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1751, 1831 (2005). 
15. See Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 10, ¶ 199 (citing Ponzano as evidence of 
common design liability under the new doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, although the 
language of the prosecutor’s statement is equally consistent with holding the defendant 
responsible as an accomplice under the natural and probable consequences doctrine). 
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motion by which the four men were shot, then they are guilty of the crime 
of killing these men.”16 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
viewed these precedents as precursors to a doctrine that it dubbed Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE).17 The basic idea behind the doctrine was that 
defendants could be convicted for their participation in a machine-like en-
deavor, even if the defendant was not the physical perpetrator of the crim-
inal act.18 The machine-like nature of the criminal syndicate—cogs working 
together to produce a machine-like result—was most evident in the second 
form of the doctrine known as JCE II.19 In that version of the doctrine, a 
defendant could be convicted for any crimes committed in a concentration 
camp, based on the premise that the camp guard (or other soldier or em-
ployee) willingly participated in an organized system of ill treatment. The 
machine metaphor is ubiquitous in JCE II cases, with the courts consistent-
ly rejecting the suggestion that concentration camp guards are mere cogs in 
the machine.20 Rather, the judges of the ICTY concluded that cogs in the 
machine were just as culpable as anyone else for the criminality produced 
by the machine.21 
 
III. INDIRECT PERPETRATION THROUGH 
MACHINE-LIKE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The notion of machine liability was brought to its natural conclusion in the 
Eichmann case.22 The Israeli court rejected the notion that Eichmann was 
                                                                                                                      
16. Id. 
17. Id., ¶ 220. 
18. See CASSESE, supra note 12, at 192–93. 
19. See Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 10, ¶ 202; CASSESE, supra note 12, at 195–
99. 
20. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 400 (2d rev. ed. 2013) (“loose talk about such inferiors as gears or cogs always 
seemed to imply that the law must treat them as ‘blameless instrument of an alien will’”). 
21. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002), ¶ 67 (holding that “[i]f the agreed 
crime is committed by one or other of the participants in a joint criminal enterprise such 
as has already been discussed, all of the participants in that enterprise are equally guilty of 
the crime regardless of the part played by each in its commission”). 
22. Adolf Eichmann was detained by Israeli agents in Argentina and transported to 
Israel where he was placed on trial in an Israeli court for being the architect of the imple-
mentation of the so-called Final Solution—the Nazi policy of killing all remaining Jews as 
quickly as possible. Officially the criminal allegations were charged as war crimes, crimes 
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himself a “cog in the machine,” and concluded instead that Eichmann was 
the driver of the entire enterprise who had deployed and “propelled” the 
machine in order to perpetrate the crimes.23 The large bureaucracy at 
Eichmann’s disposal became a machine-like enterprise that he deployed in 
order to implement the final solution; as a result, he was convicted of 
crimes against humanity.24 At the time of the Eichmann trial, the notion of 
deploying a social machine in service of mass atrocity was mostly a meta-
phor, but it would soon move from metaphor into reality. 
The Eichmann trial proved a major inspiration for Claus Roxin, who 
saw in Eichmann’s crimes a general structure for the commission of mass 
atrocity.25 Roxin was particularity influenced by Eichmann’s deployment of 
massive bureaucratic machinery under his control. This fit quite nicely with 
Roxin’s Control Theory, which asserts that the perpetrator with ultimate 
control over the crime should be labeled as the principal perpetrator (as 
opposed to a mere accomplice).26 If the perpetrator shares control over the 
crime with other perpetrators, they may be labeled as co-perpetrators by 
virtue of their shared or joint control over the crime.27 In that case, the 
multiple individuals enjoy a form of joint hegemony over the act because 
the crime cannot be committed without their joint cooperation in a mutual 
endeavor.28 This is classic co-perpetration. 
Similarly, the Control Theory also entails that individuals can be 
deemed responsible as indirect perpetrators if they use an instrument under 
                                                                                                                      
against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. After conviction, he was executed 
in 1962 as the only death sentence carried out by the Israeli judicial system. Attorney-
General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, reprinted in 36 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REPORTS 5, 331 (1968) [hereinafter Eichmann]. 
23. See id.. For an extensive discussion, see Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 12, ¶ 
265. 
24. Eichmann, supra note 22. 
25. See HECTOR OLASOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL 
AND MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 20 (2010). 
26. In German criminal law, unlike in U.S. criminal law, the decision to apply the 
principal and accomplice labels is very significant, since accomplices are entitled by statute 
to mitigation in punishment in the form of a percentage reduction compared with the 
sentence for a principal perpetrator. This contrasts markedly with U.S. criminal law, where 
most jurisdictions allow judges the discretion to give principals and accomplices the same 
sentence. 
27. See generally CLAUS ROXIN, TÄTERSCHAFT UND TATHERRSCHAFT (8th ed. 2006) 
(concluding that the perpetrator behind the scenes has ultimate hegemony over the act 
and should be classified as the principal perpetrator). 
28. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 655 (2d ed. 2000). 
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their disposal to commit the crime. In these cases, although the perpetrator 
does not perform the criminal act (or actus reus), he is nonetheless responsi-
ble because he controls the individual or individuals who perform the crimi-
nal act. In that sense, the perpetrator “uses” the physical perpetrator as an 
instrument under his direction.29 If two co-perpetrators both “use” an in-
strument in this manner, they would be responsible as indirect co-
perpetrators for perpetrating the crime through an instrument.30 The key 
issue here is that the instrument is another person, although the doctrine 
urges that we assign responsibility in just the same way as if the instrument 
were a physical thing, like a gun or a knife.   
After the Eichmann trial, Roxin was motivated to amend his Control 
Theory to include a new variant of indirect perpetration referred to as Or-
ganisationsherrschaft, or indirect perpetration through an organized apparatus 
of power.31 The idea was a specific mode of liability for cases involving the 
deployment of an organization, or machine-like entity, as the instrument of 
criminality (as opposed to a single individual, such as in garden-variety cas-
es of indirect perpetration). The reason for a separate mode of liability is 
that the organization has parts, each of which must work together in order 
to accomplish the particular result, with the entire entity working under the 
direction of the Hintermann, the mastermind behind the scenes.32 
Although this sounds far afield from a commander’s liability for de-
ploying an AWS, the requirements of the Organisationsherrschaft doctrine 
map on well to the case we are considering. The similarity stems from the 
fact that the organization is viewed as a bureaucratic machine. Specifically, 
Roxin’s doctrine required that the defendant’s order be carried out by the 
organization as a matter of course. In other words, the organization is the 
                                                                                                                      
29. See BOHLANDER, supra note 13, at 156 (cataloguing the various scenarios under 
which a perpetrator can commit an offense through another). 
30. This mode of liability is critically evaluated in Jens David Ohlin, Second-Order Link-
ing Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 771, 777–84 (2012). 
31. See Claus Roxin, Crimes as Part of Organized Power Structures, 9 JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 193 (B. Cooper trans., 2011) (translating GOLTDAMMER’S 
ARCHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT 193 (1963)). For recent analysis, see also NEHA JAIN, PERPE-
TRATORS AND ACCESSORIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL MODES OF 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTIVE CRIMES 125–140 (2014). 
32. BOHLANDER, supra note 13, at 159; MICHAEL BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIM-
INAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 90 (2008); Kai Ambos, Article 25 Individ-
ual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 743, 752 n.68 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
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“through element” by which the defendant carries out the crime, via a form 
of automaticity.33 Second, the doctrine also requires that the individual per-
sons of the organization are essentiality fungible (Fungibilität) and would be 
automatically replaced if they were unable or unwilling to perform their 
function within the organization.34 These requirements were necessary to 
view the organization as a complete subordinate to the Hintermann, as op-
posed to a collaborator working alongside the defendant. The idea here is 
that the Hintermann has complete control over the crime and uses the or-
ganization to physically perpetrate the crime, thus making it legitimate to 
view the Hintermann as the sole principal perpetrator of the crimes. 
Although the target of this doctrine is a human, bureaucratic machine, 
it could very well describe an actual machine. The only change required to 
reorient the doctrine in this way is to shift the metaphorical language of 
machine to a literal case of machine liability. The doctrinal requirements 
would be the same.35 The military commander would be responsible for the 
machine’s actions if the machine were to carry out the orders of the com-
mander as a matter of course. Furthermore, the machine’s pieces are, by 
definition, mere fungible parts, capable of replacement and having no in-
dependent existence. In other words, the weapon system as a whole works 
under the control of the military commander. In a sense, this move is un-
surprising since the normative argument for the original criminal law doc-
trine was based on the symmetry between physical instruments and organi-
zational instruments; all that is required now is to reverse the original com-
parison back to physical machines again. 
One might object that an AWS is more than just a machine; in theory it 
could operate independently, make its own decisions, and engage in target 
selection on its own.36 Indeed, this is precisely the anxiety about regulating 
                                                                                                                      
33. Jens David Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt & Thomas Weigend, Assessing the Control 
Theory, 26 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 725, 738 (2013). 
34. Jain, supra note 31, at 130. See also CARL ERIK HERLITZ, PARTIES TO A CRIME AND 
THE NOTION OF A COMPLICITY OBJECT 278 (1992).  
35. For a good discussion of individual criminal responsibility for acts committed by 
an AWS, see Markus Wagner, The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, 
Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems, 47 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1371, 1399 (2014). 
36. For a discussion of these issues, see Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law 
and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, POLICY REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/ re-
search/law-and-ethics-robot-soldiers. 
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AWS of the future.37 This might sound like a problem for the doctrine 
since it requires automatic execution of the demands of the Hintermann. In 
AWS, the system is capable of exercising its own independent judgment.38 
This is entirely consistent with Organisationsherrschaft, and indeed the 
doctrine even requires this. The idea in the doctrine is that the organization 
is a machine-like entity beholden to the whim of the Hintermann, although 
the organization usually enjoys substantial discretion over how to carry out 
its tasks.39 Indeed, that is the whole point of deploying an organization to 
commit an international crime; one individual would be incapable of exer-
cising that level of micro-control. Rather, the level of control involved in 
Organisationsherrschaft is far more macro—it is the ability to decide whether 
the crime will occur, not necessarily decide every aspect of how the crime 
will occur.40 Each part of the bureaucracy will carry out its appointed task 
with the requisite level of discretion. 
The advent of AWS creates the possibility that an AWS would have 
precisely the same level of discretion as the human organization under the 
power of the Hintermann. Indeed, the AWS might have the discretion to 
find appropriate targets and decide for itself whether the target meets cer-
tain operational, strategic and legal criteria for engagement.41 For example, 
                                                                                                                      
37. At least some scholars believe that automaticity itself does not entail that a system 
will necessarily act in ways contrary to IHL. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are 
Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1837, 1892 (2015) (“There is 
nothing intrinsic to autonomous weapon systems that would cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering; a bullet fired by an autonomous sentry robot causes the same 
amount of injury as one fired by a human sentry.”). 
38. Id. at 1894. 
39. On this point, see KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 
VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 115 (2013) (discussing, in the context of 
prosecutions of the Argentinian junta, the discretion that was given to the organizational 
apparatus of power). 
40. It is unclear if this is a coherent distinction because it presupposes a definition of 
the “crime” that spans possible words. In other words, one can imagine all sorts of ways 
in which a crime might have been committed in a different way and it is mostly arbitrary 
to say that at some point those changes requires us to label it as a different crime. 
41. Corn correctly notes that even regular soldiers have this autonomy. See Geoffrey 
S. Corn, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking the Man out of the 
Loop,” 11 (June 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2450640 (observing that “[t]his re-conception should begin by ac-
knowledging an undeniable reality: that soldiers are themselves autonomous weapon sys-
tems. The soldier, like the predicted autonomous weapon system, is capable of exercising 
cognitive reasoning. This is obviously inherent in any human being. But the soldier is not 
an ‘autonomous actor’ in the sense that she may exercise judgment with no parameters. 
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the AWS might be told to look for enemy military assets and destroy them 
when they are located, assuming that firing on them would be an efficient 
use of resources (a strategic consideration) and also assuming that firing on 
them would be consistent with basic prohibitions of IHL (a legal and ethi-
cal consideration). This level of discretion brings the AWS closer to, rather 
than further away from, the operation of a human organization deployed 
under the command of a single perpetrator.42 
 
IV. THE INNOCENT INSTRUMENTALITY RULE 
 
Before Roxin’s Organisationsherrschaft doctrine could be used as an effective 
tool in mass atrocity prosecutions, a substantial change in the doctrine was 
necessary. Originally, many domestic jurisdictions required that an instru-
ment be “non-culpable” or “innocent” in order for someone else to be 
convicted as an indirect perpetrator of the actions performed by the in-
strument.43 For example, indirect perpetration was allowed in cases where 
the defendant manipulated an insane individual into committing a crime at 
the behest of the defendant. Normally, common law lawyers would evalu-
ate the defendant as an accomplice since he did not perform the physical 
act of the killing. This result was not particularly problematic since U.S. law 
allows accomplices to be treated as severely as principals.44 However, Ger-
man criminal lawyers, with their characteristic mitigation for accomplices, 
would chafe at this particular result, so the preferred result in German 
criminal law was to view the defendant as the indirect perpetrator of the 
act, with the insane individual as a mere instrument at his disposal. Like-
wise, a defendant could be convicted as an indirect perpetrator for manipu-
lating a child into committing a crime for the benefit of the defendant; the 
                                                                                                                      
Instead, the soldier operates as an agent of responsible command, and in that capacity 
must frame her decision-making process within the parameters established by superior 
command. How the soldier is developed and prepared to exercise this inherently autono-
mous cognitive capacity without becoming an autonomous actor therefore provides a 
logical template for the ‘preparation’ of a weapon system with autonomous cognitive ca-
pacity. The goal must ultimately be to ensure the autonomous weapon functions in a 
manner that, like the soldier, is subordinated to the will and parameters imposed by re-
sponsible command. The ability to employ combat power consistent with LOAC obliga-
tions is inherent in that superior/subordinate relationship.”). 
42. Id. 
43. See Marcelo Ferrante, Argentina, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW 12, 32 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus Dubber eds., 2011). 
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
 
 
 
The Combatant’s Stance Vol. 92 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
child, under the control of the defendant, was the mere instrument of crim-
inality.45  
The limiting principle for this doctrine was that the instrument had to 
be non-culpable—in other words, functionally equivalent to a real instru-
ment. Just as one would hold a defendant responsible as a principal for us-
ing a gun to kill a victim, so too one should hold the defendant responsible 
as a principal for using an individual, just as long as that individual was not a 
free and responsible agent. If the agent was laboring under some defect of 
reason so as to make him non-culpable, then and only then could the indi-
rect perpetration theory be applied against the defendant. However, the 
defendant need not be completely incapacitated, but only non-culpable in-
sofar as the crime is concerned. It would, therefore, be appropriate to use 
the doctrine if the defendant manipulated a sane individual so completely 
that he or she was laboring under a mistake of fact and non-culpable for 
that reason.46 
However, applying the innocent instrumentality rule would be a major 
barrier to applying indirect perpetration in the Eichmann case. While Eich-
mann was certainly the most culpable individual within his bureaucratic 
department, he was not the only culpable individual. Those who served un-
derneath him were culpable in their own way for carrying out individual 
acts of murder, mistreatment and persecution against Jews. If convicting 
Eichmann under the doctrine of indirect perpetration required denying the 
culpability of those who executed his commands, then that would be too 
high a jurisprudential price. The soldiers on the ground were neither in-
sane, nor acting under duress, nor mistake of fact. They were still culpable, 
though less culpable than Eichmann himself. 
Over time, the innocent instrumentality rule was dropped in some ju-
risdictions.47 This was not so much a feature of the Eichmann case, but ra-
ther a general anxiety over the requirement in all cases.48 Scholars and 
                                                                                                                      
45. See BOHLANDER, supra note 13, at 156. 
46. See ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 95 (2012). 
47. For example, the rule was abandoned in Germany in the Katzenkönig Case, 4 StR 
352/88, BGHSt. 35, 347 (German Federal Court of Justice, 1988). Obviously, in jurisdic-
tions that retain the rule, the doctrine of indirect perpetration has a much narrower appli-
cation. 
48. For a discussion, see AMBOS, supra note 39, at 160. See also AVITUS A. AGBOR, IN-
STIGATION TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 11 n.1 (2013); Kai Ambos, The Fujimori 
Judgment: A President’s Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity as Indirect Perpetrator by Virtue 
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courts both agreed that a defendant could exercise sufficient control over 
an individual or organization—as an instrument of criminality—even if the 
physical perpetrators were still culpable for their actions. Of course, this 
required a delicate dance. If the defendant truly controlled the crime, then it 
would seem safe to assume that the physical perpetrator was not in control. 
If the physical perpetrator was not in control, then he could not be respon-
sible for his actions as a free moral agent. The answer to this quandary is 
that “control” for purposes of the Control Theory is not the type of con-
trol that crowds out all other forms of responsibility, which can be based 
on lower degrees of authority with regard to the physical perpetrators.49  
When indirect perpetration was incorporated into the law of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC), where it has been used to prosecute de-
fendants such as Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,50 and underlies the indictment against President al-Bashir of Su-
dan,51 the innocent instrumentality rule had already been excised from the 
doctrine. This was essential for its widespread adoption as the preeminent 
mode of liability for collective criminality.52 International courts are gener-
ally tasked with prosecuting higher-level politicians and military planners 
who are considered most responsible for wartime misconduct. That being 
said, international prosecutions must not “crowd out” alternative mecha-
nisms for accountability at the local level, at least some of which might tar-
get street-level perpetrators who commit crimes as instruments of the Hin-
termann. Indeed, the doctrine of positive complementarity assumes (and 
even celebrates) local systems of justice that carry out such prosecutions, 
even in a world with a functioning International Criminal Court.53 If the 
                                                                                                                      
of an Organized Power Apparatus, 9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137, 
147 (2011). 
49. For a discussion, see HANS VEST, VÖLKERRECHTSVERBRECHER 375 (2011). 
50. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶ 340 (Jan. 29, 2007).  
51. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on Prosecution’s Ap-
plication for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/09, ¶ 216 (Mar. 4, 2009). For analysis, see Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss, 
On the Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at The Hague?, 
6 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL  CRIMINAL JUSTICE 853 (2008). 
52. This decision was codified in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, which states 
that a person shall be convicted if he “commits such a crime, whether as an individual, 
jointly with another of through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminal-
ly responsible.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (emphasis added). 
53. See SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE 109 (2013). 
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doctrines applied by the ICC were to imply that the street-level perpetra-
tors were not responsible for their actions, this would be a deeply troubling 
and counter-intuitive result for international justice. 
To summarize the current state of affairs: early on, international crimi-
nal justice used the metaphor of the machine to describe mass criminality 
in wartime. To operationalize that insight into doctrinal reality, contempo-
rary international courts now prosecute higher-level political leaders as in-
direct perpetrators when they deploy an organized and hierarchical appa-
ratus of power as an instrument of criminality. Furthermore, these prosecu-
tions are not barred by the fact that the individuals who make up the rele-
vant organizations are themselves culpable for their participation in the 
criminality. I conclude that this doctrine provides the basic framework for 
prosecuting a military commander or other political leader for deploying an 
AWS that perpetrates a war crime. 
 
V. THE COMBATANT’S STANCE 
 
There are, of course, grave philosophical questions over the status of AWS, 
which could be technologically simple or phenomenologically quite com-
plex, depending on the nature of the system. Various proposals abound in 
the scholarly literature for evaluating the status of artificial entities as ra-
tional agents. The Turing Test is one obvious example, although it assumes 
the existence of a conversational agent, which may not be applicable here.54 
In “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Turing imagined an evaluator 
having a conversation, via written messages, with two interlocutors.55 One 
of the interlocutors was a programmed computer while the other interlocu-
tor was a human being. Turing suggested that if, after a period of conversa-
tion, the evaluator was unable to determine which interlocutor was the 
computer and which was the real human being, then we should conclude 
that the computer was a “thinking” machine, i.e. an artificial form of con-
sciousness.56   
The test is philosophically controversial; it seems to equate behavior 
with mental states, or at the very least to treat sophisticated behavior as a 
crude proxy for deeper mental states.57 While it is one thing to treat com-
                                                                                                                      
54. See DAVID BRADDON-MITCHELL & FRANK JACKSON, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
AND COGNITION 109 (1996). 
55. See Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433–60 (1950). 
56. Id. 
57. For criticism, see JOHN SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE (1984). 
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plex behavior as a proxy for cognition, it is quite another to treat it as a reli-
able proxy for consciousness. It would seem that not every machine capable 
of satisfying the Turing Test would have something approaching con-
sciousness. 
In any event, the Turing Test by its own terms is inappropriate for 
evaluating an AWS, since it presumes the existence of a putative conversa-
tional agent.58 An AWS probably would not be configured in this way. But 
this objection can be quickly dispensed with. One could modify the Turing 
Test in non-conversational terms, such that the artificial agent would quali-
fy for personhood if its behavior simpliciter (as opposed to linguistic behav-
ior) were virtually indistinguishable from the behavior of a natural human 
being. One could then further modify the Turing Test to apply it to AWS. 
The original Turing Test was based on the idea that the artificial computer 
could engage in a game—whether a linguistic game or a chess game—in 
such a complex way that its behavior was indistinguishable from that of a 
natural person.  
This was, in a sense, a version of pragmatism: if the artificial being is 
truly indistinguishable from a natural person, how could one do anything 
but treat it as a natural person and approach it with Dennett’s intentional 
stance or Pettit’s conversational stance?59 Indeed, the whole point of be-
havior interpretation is that another conversational agent would be re-
quired to attribute beliefs and desires to the agent in order to understand its 
behavior in a meaningful way.60 If that situation comes to pass, then the 
conversational agent has, out of necessity, made the decision already. By 
the necessity of the situation, the artificial agent must be treated as a ration-
                                                                                                                      
58. On the notion of a conversational agent, see PHILIP PETTIT, THE COMMON MIND 
354 (1996) (discussing the conversational stance, an extension of Dennett’s intentional 
stance). 
59. See DANIEL DENNETT, BRAINSTORMS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 6 (1981) (“Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computer 
really has beliefs and desires are misplaced; for the definition of intentional systems I have 
given does not say that intentional systems really have beliefs and desires, but that one can 
explain and predict their behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them, and whether one 
calls what one ascribes to the computer beliefs or belief-analogues or information com-
plexes or intentional whatnots makes no difference to the nature of the calculation one 
makes on the basis of the ascriptions.”). 
60. One way of putting the point is that the ascription of beliefs and desires to the ar-
tificial system would be part and parcel with Davidson’s Principle of Charity, though per-
haps not strictly required by it. See Donald Davidson, Radical Interpretation, 27 DIALECTICA 
314–28 (1973); SIMON EVNINE, DONALD DAVIDSON 108 (1991). 
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al being (by ascribing beliefs and desires to it) because there is no other way 
of interacting with the agent and making sense of its behavior. 
The same argument could be applied to an AWS in battle. The idea of a 
Turing Test for Combatancy would be that the non-linguistic behavior of 
the AWS—acting at a distance—would be functionally indistinguishable from 
any other combatant engaged in an armed conflict.61 This would mean that 
the AWS does everything that any other combatant does: engage enemy 
targets, attempt to destroy them, attempt as best as possible to comply with 
the core demands of IHL (if it is programmed to obey them) and most 
likely prioritize force protection over enemy civilians. In this situation, an 
enemy combatant would be unable to distinguish the AWS from a natural 
human combatant. More importantly, the enemy combatant would be 
forced to interact with the AWS in just the same way that it engages with 
natural enemy combatants: it would have to destroy it, avoid it, or surren-
der to it and hope that it complies with the prohibition against killing sur-
rendered combatants.62 This would raise the same type of anxiety as the 
Turing Test: one could imagine an elaborately programmed device that was 
merely copying intelligent human behavior without actually engaging in intel-
ligent behavior. The appearance of independent thought might not be the 
same thing as independent thought. In this situation, though, would any 
deeper question regarding the intentional states of the AWS really matter? As 
a matter of practical rationality, nothing would change. 
Consequently, the standard for rational belligerency is whether an op-
posing combatant views the AWS as virtually indistinguishable from any 
other combatant, not in the sense of being physically indistinguishable 
(which is absurd), but rather functionally indistinguishable in the sense that 
the combatant is required to attribute beliefs and desires and other inten-
tional states to the AWS in order to understand the entity and interact with 
it—not so much as a conversational agent but to interact with the AWS as 
an enemy combatant. This is the Combatant’s Stance. 
                                                                                                                      
61. The term “combatant”’ in this discussion is meant to refer to the common-sense 
use of the word, meaning a soldier in combat, and is not meant to carry the significance of 
the legal term of art. 
62. See, e.g., Robert Sparrow, Twenty Seconds to Comply: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the 
Recognition of Surrender Robert Sparrow, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 699 (2015) (recog-
nizing the importance of surrender recognition and discussing various technological and 
legal solutions that might allow combatants to effectively surrender to autonomous weap-
on systems). 
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What does it mean to interact with an AWS as an enemy combatant, to 
take the combatant’s stance in one’s interaction with it? Indeed, it might 
not be obvious that enemy combatants interact with each other at all, since 
they are trying to kill each other. But this would be a hasty conclusion. 
Combatants are, in fact, confederates in some deeper sense, members of a 
global fraternity of professional soldiers who operate according to a differ-
ent code of conduct that finds expression in rules of engagement, norms of 
ethical conduct, and legal prohibitions.63 Professional soldiers hold them-
selves and each other to specific standards: they wear uniforms and distin-
guish themselves from the civilian population, they limit their direct attacks 
to military targets, and their aim is to kill the enemy without avarice or sad-
ism, but simply to achieve the war aim and end the conflict as quickly as 
possible.64 These ethical and legal norms bind together professional sol-
diers, even those fighting on opposite sides of a battlefield. 
With these shared norms in mind, it is at least possible to imagine an 
AWS whose behavior was such that it could only be understood in this light, 
as operating under those constraints and being subject to them as well.65 If 
the AWS were limiting its attacks in this way, and demanding of others 
with whom it operated a similar level of constraint, it would be hard to in-
teract with the AWS in any other way. Understanding its behavior would 
be impossible unless one attributed to it certain normative commitments, 
i.e. to pursue warfare within the above constraints. One would need to en-
gage with the AWS as an enemy combatant, as opposed to engaging with the 
AWS as a weapon.66 This would signal that the AWS is, in fact, pragmatically 
                                                                                                                      
63. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Legal Development and Historical Basis, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 18 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
64. Killing simply to inflict suffering on the enemy has no place in the actions of a 
professional soldier. See U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, arts. 14–16, Apr. 24, 
1863 (Lieber Code). 
65. But see Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?, 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY, & POLICY 45, 50 (2013) 
(“There are substantial debates in the robotics community regarding the likelihood of 
highly intelligent systems ever being developed.”). 
66. In order to engage in this process of behavior interpretation, it would not be nec-
essary to understand the intricacies of the program’s mechanics, but simply understand the 
goals that the system is trying to rationally obtain. See Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner 
& Matthew Waxman, Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386, 394 (2014) [hereinafter Anderson, Reisner & Wax-
man, Adapting the Law] (“Perhaps foremost among these is the fact that as machine-
learning and artificial intelligence technologies develop, it is becoming increasingly clear 
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equal to an intentional agent in warfare. This would mean adopting the 
combatant’s stance in one’s interaction with the AWS because this would 
provide one with the best avenue for understanding its behavior. This ap-
proach would be justified by pure pragmatism. And asking deeper ques-
tions about the underlying cognitive states of the AWS—as John Searle 
would encourage us to do with his Chinese Room thought experiment67—
would be largely irrelevant for how we interact with the AWS. Adopting 
the combatant’s stance means that treating the AWS as an enemy combat-
ant—and ascribing to it certain beliefs and desires regarding its ultimate 
goal of winning the war and what belligerent actions it takes in order to 
achieve that goal—would be the only way of understanding, predicting and 
ultimately defeating its behavior. 
One might object that deeper questions of cognition might be im-
portant for determining whether the AWS is a moral agent and whether the 
rights and duties of combatants can be legitimately ascribed to them.68 If 
the AWS is merely copying rational behavior, then arguably it is not a moral 
agent; in that case, it would make no sense to say that the AWS has a moral 
right not to be killed or tortured after capture. By extension, if the AWS is 
not a moral agent, it would make little sense to hold it accountable for its 
violations of international criminal law through some form of machine 
punishment. These are, of course, legitimate constraints on the moral pro-
                                                                                                                      
that human beings may not necessarily always be able to understand how (and possibly 
why) autonomous systems make decisions. In some cases, this is a question of the com-
plexity of the system, making it realistically impossible to fully predict in advance how the 
system will behave, to understand the reasoning behind the system’s decision making as it 
happens or even to reconstruct after the fact how it did behave.”). 
67. See John Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, 3 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 
417–57 (1980) (describing a thought experiment where an individual is in a locked room 
with a manual for mechanically transcribing a set of Chinese characters into responses that 
are then given back to a person on the outside). Searle concludes that although the re-
sponses of the person in the room are identical to a person who speaks and understands 
Chinese, the person in the room does not “understand” Chinese in any meaningful sense. 
He concludes, on the basis of this intuition, that computers capable of engaging in behav-
ior that is functionally indistinguishable from the behavior of human beings are not, pace 
Turing, engaged in meaningful thought or artificial intelligence. In other words, “whatever 
purely formal principles you put into the computer, they will not be sufficient for under-
standing, since a human will be able to follow the formal principles without understanding 
anything.” Id. 
68. Cf. ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AU-
TONOMOUS WEAPONS 140 (2009) (concluding that the use of robots in combat raises 
multiple ethical and moral issues even if robots are not capable of emotion or meaningful 
intelligence). 
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cesses of holding other rational agents accountable for their behavior and 
decisions. Furthermore, adopting the combatant’s stance in no way logical-
ly presumes, or even assumes, an answer regarding the moral status of the 
other combatant. 
However, IHL is not reducible to individual criminal accountability or 
even moral responsibility. Even in situations where particular agents are 
not culpable—and not valid subjects of ex post criminal punishment—the 
rest of IHL is still applicable. To see why this is so, consider an army com-
posed entirely of children. The children might be so young that they are 
not fully responsible agents, and in any event as a matter of law the ICC 
would not have jurisdiction to prosecute them for committing violations of 
the Rome Statute (because it excludes jurisdiction over children).69 In this 
situation, the conflict with this child army would still be governed by the 
core principles of IHL, and both sides of the conflict would be duty bound 
by jus in bello to comply with its restrictions. The same thing could be said 
regarding an armed conflict against an army composed of psychotic aggres-
sors.70 
Now apply this insight to a conflict that includes an AWS. If the AWS 
is indeed functionally indistinguishable at a distance from a natural com-
batant, then all combatants would be forced to treat, by logical necessity, 
the AWS as they would any other combatants, both in order to understand 
its behavior but also to decide on whatever counter-move is appropriate. It 
being impossible to see inside the AWS and learn its programming from 
the inside, the best way of predicting or understanding its behavior would 
be to posit the very same mental states (including beliefs and desires) that 
one posits when confronted with a natural combatant and attempt to come 
to terms with its behavior and why it is doing one thing rather than anoth-
er. There would be no other practical alternative for how one engages with 
an AWS; one would have to adopt the combatant’s stance with it. 
One might object that in battle a combatant would simply blow up an 
AWS and would not “engage” with the AWS on any level—intentional, 
conversational, combatant, or otherwise. This objection misses the point. 
In some circumstances, blowing up the AWS would constitute “engaging” 
with it as a natural enemy combatant, since often that is what one does to 
enemy combatants in battle. But that simple interaction hides a complex set 
                                                                                                                      
69. See Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 26. 
70. The issue of psychotic aggressors was first addressed by George Fletcher in his 
essay George Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative 
Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 367 (1973). 
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of assessments that structure the interaction: the assumption that the other 
combatant constitutes an enemy, that the other combatant would destroy 
you if it had the opportunity, that its movements on the battlefield are eva-
sive in nature and designed to avoid detection or destruction, that engaging 
the other combatant is consistent with one’s rules of engagement (if one is 
committed to their observance) and that destroying the agent is constitu-
tive of the war aim and would hasten, in some small way, a victorious con-
clusion to the conflict. These are all complex assessments that are internal 
to the relationship of belligerency between the parties. The fact that one of 
the parties to the engagement is an artificial agent in no way liberates the 
other combatants from having to engage with the AWS in this way. In oth-
er words, victory over the AWS would require adopting the combatant’s 
stance towards it and treating it as an enemy combatant. 
Again, the fact that the AWS is not a responsible agent for purposes of 
criminal law is irrelevant to determining whether the AWS should be 
viewed and interpreted with the combatant’s stance. Moral agency for pur-
poses of determining rights and responsibilities is one thing; treating the 
AWS as an enemy combatant is quite another. One might object here that 
many of the principles of IHL are based on rights that flow from the moral 
dignity of the combatants, such as the right to be free from torture or the 
right not to be summarily executed after capture. This much is true but it is 
beside the point. Even if one assumes that the AWS is entitled to none of 
the IHL protections that flow from moral agency (and could be summarily 
destroyed after capture, for example), it would still be the case that engag-
ing the AWS in battle, and understanding its behavior, would require think-
ing of the AWS as an enemy combatant pursuing particular objectives in 
accordance with its own rules of engagement. Whether those objectives 
and rules of engagement are the result of humanlike obedience towards 
command influence or, in contrast, the result of its internal programming, 
would make no difference for how the combatant engages with, treats and 
thinks about the AWS. It would be, in other words, an enemy combatant 
simpliciter. Any deeper investigation of intentional states would be irrelevant 
for inquiry and pragmatic interaction.71 
Having now defended an account for evaluating the status of an AWS 
as a rational agent and combatant, I want to emphasize that this inquiry is 
                                                                                                                      
71. Obviously, part of the inspiration here is Richard Rorty’s suggestion that if some-
thing makes no difference to inquiry it should make no difference to philosophy—a motto 
for pragmatism if you will. See RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 19 (1998). 
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logically independent of the analysis regarding the commander’s liability for 
deploying the AWS. As I tried to outline in the previous section, the com-
mander is liable for the crimes committed by the AWS regardless of 
whether the AWS is a responsible moral agent or not and regardless of 
whether the AWS satisfies the Turing Test for Combatancy as I have out-
lined it above or whether an enemy combatant would adopt the combat-
ant’s stance in his or her interaction with it. That conclusion follows logi-
cally from the rejection of the innocent instrumentality rule—a doctrinal 
move that was made for solid normative reasons. Even if the “instrument” 
of one’s criminality is a morally culpable agent, there are still some situa-
tions when the commander ought to be viewed as a principal perpetrator 
who controls the crime indirectly. The participation of the AWS would be 
the “through element” by which the crime is completed, analogous to the 
hierarchical organization that is deployed in Organisationsherrschaft cases.  
 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF RECKLESSNESS 
 
Unfortunately, there are other areas of its doctrine where international 
criminal law is not well suited to prosecuting commanders for committing 
an international crime through an AWS. The uncontroversial (and probably 
rare) cases involve a commander who purposefully deploys an AWS to 
commit an international crime such as deliberately killing civilians or engag-
ing in genocide. In that instance the current doctrine functions adequately. 
But these are unlikely (though important) circumstances. The far more fre-
quent occurrence is one where the commander deploys the AWS for mili-
tary operations and the AWS violates a core prohibition of IHL: distinc-
tion, necessity, or proportionality.72 Furthermore, if the commander is 
                                                                                                                      
72. Several scholars have argued that a commander who deploys an AWS that com-
mits an international crime should be liable under basic principles of command responsi-
bility. See, e.g., Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing Au-
tonomous Weapons Systems, 8 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 189, 236 
(2015) (“Therefore, military commanders are assigned responsibility even if they do not 
control the outcome, because they are accountable for the creating conditions [sic] under 
which their subordinates act. Although an AWS is not a subordinate, stricto senso, because it 
is a weapon and not a sentient being, a commander nevertheless retains effective control 
over this weapon and subsequent employment on the battlefield no differently from any 
other military equipment.”). Designers and programmers could be liable for failure to pro-
gram the AWS with sufficient concern for proportionality or other IHL norms. See 
BOOTHBY, supra note 3, at 146; CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN 
IDEALISM AND REALISM 346–47 (3d ed. 2014) (suggesting that fully autonomous systems 
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aware of the strong possibility of this outcome, the commander is reckless 
as to his deployment of the AWS.73 
Although this sounds like bread and butter application of IHL princi-
ples, international criminal law has a serious blind spot where crimes of 
recklessness are concerned, and no one is clear how they fit into a general 
theory of international criminality.74 Take, for example, Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute, which lists the default mental requirements for international 
crimes as intent and knowledge “unless otherwise provided.”75 Unfortu-
nately, it is unsettled whether Article 30 permits a conviction for crimes of 
recklessness or what civil law trained criminal lawyers call dolus eventualis 
(liability for the risk of a future event and a concrete decision to move for-
ward even in light of the negative outcome). Some scholars have argued 
that “intent” in Article 30 includes dolus eventualis, since criminal lawyers in 
civil law jurisdictions are trained to think of it as a species of “intent” (dolus) 
in the broadest sense of the word. In contrast, common law trained crimi-
nal lawyers are inclined to view intent as encompassing purpose and 
knowledge, but not recklessness, which is a less culpable mental state than 
“intent.” The other possible route for reading dolus eventualis or recklessness 
into Article 30 of the Rome Statute is through the “unless otherwise pro-
vided” prong, which envisions that specific international crimes might al-
low lower mental states to qualify for a conviction, provided that this de-
parture from the Article 30 default mental state requirement is actually cod-
ified somewhere.76 
                                                                                                                      
will fail to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality but “it will be hard, 
almost impossible, to establish criminal responsibility”). 
73. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in establishing mens rea for military 
commanders deploying an AWS, see Wagner, supra note 35, at 1406 (discussing situations 
where a “commanding officer sends AWS into a situation for which they were not de-
signed”). See also Allyson Hauptman, Autonomous Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, 218 
MILITARY LAW REVIEW 170, 194–95 (2013) (“As the concept of command responsibility 
had to develop, its application to autonomous weapons systems will as well.”). 
74. Other scholars have noted that the criminal law may have problems regulating 
negligent or reckless behavior with regard to AWS. See Kastan, supra note 65, at 78 (“The 
largest gap in applying current civil law to AWSs is in the area of operational negligence. It 
is not clear how courts would approach who may be properly held negligent in the case of 
deploying AWSs.”). 
75. See Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 30. 
76. But see Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of 
the ICC Statute and the Mental Elements of Crimes Under International Criminal Law, 3 JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35, 41 (2005) (arguing that lower mental states 
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This is relevant because some IHL lawyers believe that a number of 
war crimes are governed by a lower mental state such as recklessness or 
dolus eventualis.77 For example, the ICRC Commentary to the Geneva Con-
vention concludes that the appropriate mental state for the war crime of 
indiscriminately attacking a civilian population—a crime that would cer-
tainly be relevant for a rogue AWS—is recklessness.78 In other words, a 
commander who orders an attack that is indiscriminate would violate the 
relevant IHL prohibition if he is simply reckless as to this result. One could 
very well imagine this scenario playing out with the AWS as the relevant 
weapons platform executing the indiscriminate attack.79 
The issue of recklessness also comes into play, albeit controversially, 
when specific modes of liability are applied to the military commander. At 
least some interpretations of command responsibility allow for a military 
commander to be prosecuted for crimes committed by subordinates if the 
military commander fails to adequately punish or investigate the crimes.80 
This has nothing to do with intent or purpose with regard to the resulting 
crimes, but rather is a crime of recklessness—failure to supervise or punish 
troops under one’s command is reckless because the commander realizes 
that there is a risk that lack of discipline might lead to the commission of 
war crimes—but the commander refuses to supervise his troops anyway.81 
Furthermore, the third variant of the Joint Criminal Enterprise doctrine 
(JCE III) also involves a crime of recklessness or dolus eventualis, because the 
defendant is convicted for criminal acts performed by other members of 
the JCE, even if those acts fall outside of the scope of the criminal design. 
                                                                                                                      
from customary international law are incorporated into Article 30 through the “unless oth-
erwise provided” phrase). 
77. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 25–32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
78. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 3474 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) (defining the war crime of willfully attacking civilians as 
“the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act 
and its consequences, and willing them (‘criminal intent’ or ‘malice aforethought’); this 
encompasses the concepts of ‘wrongful intent’ or ‘recklessness,’ viz., the attitude of an 
agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happen-
ing; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a 
man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences”). 
79. See Wagner, supra note 35, at 1407. 
80. GUÉNAEL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 225 (2009). 
81. For a discussion of the mental state, see generally MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR, 
THE CONCEPT OF MENS REA IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2013). 
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The only doctrinal constraint on JCE III is that the defendants reasonably 
foresee the possibility that confederates would stray from the agreed upon 
plan and the defendants willingly took the risk anyway. This is reckless-
ness.82 
The problem here—and it is a major problem—is that the doctrine has 
no way of encoding this lower level mental state in the grading of the of-
fense. In contrast, domestic criminal law usually distinguishes between 
homicides committed with intent and those committed with recklessness 
or negligence. A typical legislative grading scheme in, say, the United States, 
classifies first-degree murder as intentional homicide, while second-degree 
murder penalizes homicides committed with depraved indifference to hu-
man life. Other homicides performed recklessly, but which do not meet the 
depraved indifference threshold, are classified as manslaughter. The key 
point here is not the specifics of the classification scheme, but rather the 
bare fact that the definition of offenses reflects key differences in culpabil-
ity. The most culpable killers are convicted of one offense, while less cul-
pable killers are convicted of a lesser offense—whatever that may be. 
This legislative grading of culpability is not only pragmatically desirable 
and smart policy—it also constitutes a moral imperative. Defendants and 
society both have a reasonable expectation that the criminal categories that 
are attached to their conduct will adequately reflect the state of their crimi-
nality and will not unreasonably conflate significant differences in culpabil-
ity. This notion is often referred to in the literature as “fair labeling.”83 Alt-
hough it would be an exaggeration to claim that defendants in the United 
States have a constitutional right to fair labeling, it is nonetheless a funda-
mental principle of criminal law and arguably one that is implicit in the 
principle of culpability. Indeed, the principle of culpability means that de-
fendants should never be convicted of offenses that are defined in such a 
way that they make no attempt to calibrate convictions for particular of-
fenses and individual judgments regarding culpability.   
The counter-point to this argument is that judges can usually make rela-
tive determinations of culpability at the sentencing phase, thus ensuring 
that defendants never receive a punishment that exceeds their level of cul-
pability. While this is an attractive point, it ignores the entire impulse be-
hind the special part of the criminal law, which is to require legislative and 
pre-announced definitions of the offenses, which make morally significant 
                                                                                                                      
82. See ILIAS BANTEKAS & ‎SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33 (2009). 
83. See Andrew Ashworth, The Elasticity of Mens Rea, in CRIME, PROOF, AND PUNISH-
MENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 45 (C.F.H. Tapper ed., 1981). 
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distinctions regarding culpability. To suggest that a judge can make all of 
these distinctions at sentencing is to open up an impermissible level of dis-
cretion towards the sentencing phase and to reduce the guilt phase to the 
simple question of whether the defendant engaged in some culpable act, ra-
ther than determining his level of culpability based on the specific legal 
prohibition that he or she has violated. 
International criminal lawyers are usually sensitive to this point when it 
comes to the distinction between principals and accessories.84 Since the dis-
tinction is imperative to the deep structure of several domestic systems of 
criminal law, lawyers from those jurisdictions are inclined to argue that in-
ternational criminal law must distinguish between principals and accomplic-
es in its doctrine, as opposed to simply handing down different sentences 
without labeling one as principal and another as accomplice. To a German 
criminal lawyer, for example, a unitary approach to perpetration violates 
the principle of fair labeling—the idea that the criminal law ought to attach 
the right labels to the conduct.85 For this reason, unitary theories of perpe-
tration (which ignore the distinction between principals and accomplices) 
have garnered little traction in international criminal law recently.86 Strange-
ly, though, the same point is not always recognized when crimes of reck-
lessness are understood. Domestic criminal law contains specific doctrinal 
labels for defendants who have engaged in crimes of mere recklessness: 
they are punished for different offenses and not confused with murderers 
who commit intentional killings. This is also demanded by the principle of 
fair labeling. 
Unfortunately, though, international criminal law has no analogue to 
manslaughter, a specific offense that separates out reckless defendants 
from those who commit intentional crimes. The core international crimes 
are aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. True, 
each so-called “chapeau” offense must be linked with a more specific pred-
icate offense such as killing, persecution, torture, etc., from a defined list of 
predicate offenses that are different for each chapeau offense. What would 
be needed is a different chapeau offense that distinguishes between, say, an 
                                                                                                                      
84. See Gerhard Werle & Boris Burghardt, Establishing Degrees of Responsibility: Modes of 
Participation in Article 25 of the ICC Statute, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 301 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014). 
85. Id. 
86. For one recent and cogently argued example, see James G. Stewart, The End of 
“Modes of Liability” For International Crimes?, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
165 (2012). 
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intentional war criminal from a reckless war criminal, or distinguishing 
someone whose conduct carried the risk of being a crime against humanity 
from someone who intentionally carried out such a crime. 
For some of these crimes, recklessness or dolus eventualis has generally 
been excluded. For example, the crime of genocide requires that the de-
fendant act with a dolus specialis, i.e. genocidal intent. Most scholars, even 
Antonio Cassese, concluded that the requirement of genocidal intent is, by 
definition, inconsistent with the application of recklessness or dolus eventu-
alis.87 But, as for other crimes, most especially war crimes (and to a lesser 
extent crimes against humanity), the question of recklessness and dolus even-
tualis remains a hotly debated subject, with some scholars concluding that it 
is imperative for policy reasons that proving reckless conduct should satisfy 
the prosecutorial burden for a conviction for many international crimes.88 
And often the recklessness comes in through the teeth of the mode of lia-
bility, further obfuscating the distinctions of culpability that the criminal 
law ought to be highlighting and magnifying, not obscuring.89 The question 
remains, though, why do we police so thoroughly levels of culpability with 
regard to principals and accessories, but the similarly important distinction 
between intentional and reckless conduct gets a free pass in international 
criminal law? If we are committed to the principle of fair labeling in the 
doctrine itself (as opposed to letting sentencing taking care of it) then we 
should demand clarity in this area of the doctrine as well. 
This is a huge problem for the prosecution of a commander who has 
deployed an AWS that commits a war crime. As I said above, the most like-
ly scenario is that the military commander was reckless in his deployment 
of the AWS, in the sense that he was aware of the risk that the AWS would 
violate a core prohibition in IHL, but the military commander decided to 
deploy the system anyway.90 But is it really appropriate to convict this mili-
                                                                                                                      
87. Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 109 (2007). 
88. See, e.g., Steffen Wirth, Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment, 10 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 971, 990 (2012). 
89. See Stewart, supra note 86, at 175. 
90. For a similar conclusion, see Tim McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: 
Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES. 361, 384–85 (2014) (“In situations of legally significant levels of autonomy, 
the operator who deploys the weapons system may well be excused of individual liability 
for lack of effective control over the behavior of the weapons system. However, the 
commander who has called for the deployment of the weapons system will be on notice 
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tary commander for the exact same crime as the war criminal who intention-
ally targets civilians or intentionally executes a fallen soldier who is hors de 
combat or a prisoner of war? Surely, the war criminal who commits these 
intentional crimes (whether by his own hands or indirectly through the de-
ployment of an AWS) is much more culpable than the commander who 
has recklessly deployed an AWS that fails to abide by the restrictions im-
posed by IHL. As it stands now, there is no convincing way to codify these 
distinctions. Although international criminal law has largely skirted this is-
sue, the prosecution of a commander for indirectly perpetrating a crime 
through an AWS will place this problem on the front burner. 
Are there any solutions to this problem? One solution is to fully exon-
erate a military commander for recklessly perpetrating a war crime indirect-
ly through an AWS, but this seems unsatisfactory.91 While this hypothetical 
military commander is less culpable than one who deploys the AWS with 
the intent of committing the crime, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
the defendant is not culpable at all. What possibilities exist for representing 
the commander’s culpability?92  
One possibility is to take off the shelf—and re-purpose—the distinc-
tion between principals and accessories and use it to represent the distinc-
tion between crimes of intent and crimes of recklessness. In other words, if 
a military commander is merely reckless as to the violations of IHL com-
                                                                                                                      
once the system behaves in such a manner as to have resulted in a serious violation of the 
law of armed conflict.”). 
91. Commentators who have written about international responsibility for crimes 
committed by AWS have generally not discussed the problem of adequately distinguishing 
between crimes of negligence and crimes of intent. See, e.g., George R. Lucas, Jr., Legal and 
Ethical Precepts Governing Emerging Military Technologies: Research and Use, 2013 UTAH LAW 
REVIEW 1271, 1280 (2013) (“By contrast, R&D, design, or manufacturing of systems un-
dertaken through culpable ignorance or in deliberate or willful disregard of these precepts 
(including failure to perform or attempts to falsify the results, tests regarding safety, relia-
bility of operation, or compliance with applicable law and ROEs, especially in the after-
math of malfunctions as noted above) shall be subject to designation as war crimes under 
international law, or as reckless endangerment or criminally negligent behavior under the 
terms of applicable international or domestic law.”). 
92. Criminal prosecutions might be subject to other obstacles as well. See McFarland 
& McCormack, supra note 90, at 384 (“Attempting to identify an individual most responsi-
ble for subsequent behavior of a deployed weapons system that constitutes a war crime 
may simply be too difficult for the purposes of initiating trial proceedings.”). Also, some 
of the responsible perpetrators may be corporations, who are currently not prosecutable 
before most international tribunals. For more discussion, see Jack M. Beard, Autonomous 
Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
617, 648 (2014). 
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mitted by the AWS that he deploys, then perhaps the military commander 
should be convicted as an accomplice, despite the fact that the commander 
meets all other doctrinal requirements for prosecution as a principal, i.e. he 
indirectly perpetrated the crime through the AWS as an instrument of his 
criminality.93 Labeling a military commander as an accomplice in this con-
text would capture his relative degree of culpability as compared to com-
manders who commit crimes of intent. One potential downside to this 
doctrinal solution is that it requires—unlike the discussion above—that the 
AWS be viewed as a morally responsible agent. Why? As a matter of logic 
and structure, accomplice liability is derivative and requires the existence of 
some principal perpetrator—somewhere—whose endeavor is then sup-
ported or assisted by the accomplice. But if the AWS is neither autono-
mous nor responsible, then there is no principal perpetrator in the scenario 
to whom the military commander can direct his assistance. Accomplice lia-
bility would require the very finding that I earlier suggested that interna-
tional criminal law could safely avoid.  
The other possibility, which avoids this conundrum, is to codify a new 
criminal offense for recklessly perpetrating an international crime (under 
some circumstances).94 The military commander who recklessly deploys an 
AWS that violates IHL would then be guilty of a specific criminal offense, 
whose criminal definition would make clear that the crime is less culpable 
                                                                                                                      
93. Sassóli concludes that a military commander should be liable for actions commit-
ted by an AWS, though strictly speaking not under the command responsibility doctrine. 
See Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open 
Technical Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clarified, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308, 324 
(2014) (“As for the first options, it is as fair to hold a commander of a robot accountable 
as it would be to hold accountable a commander who instructs a pilot to bomb a target he 
describes as a military headquarters, but which turns out to be a kindergarten.”). Sassóli 
concludes that the commander’s responsibility in these cases is one of direct responsibility, 
not derivative responsibility, because the AWS is a mere instrument like any other weapon. 
Id. 
94. I should note that this article focuses on formal legal regulation through criminal 
responsibility. Of course, there are also avenues of informal legal regulation that I have not 
considered here. See Crootof, supra note 37, at 1901 (“The international legal system has 
myriad alternative sources of guidance and governance, many of which can be extremely 
effective in channeling state action, notwithstanding their lack of formal international legal 
status.”). One reason to focus on criminal regulation is that the basic institutional resources 
are already in place. See Lucas, supra note 91, at 1275 (“Instead, a regulatory and criminal 
regime, respecting relative legal jurisdictions, already exists to hold accountable individuals 
and organizations that might engage in reckless or criminally negligent behavior in the 
design, manufacture, and ultimate use of unmanned systems of any sort.”). 
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than the other core crimes of international law. The virtue of this approach 
is that it would signal to the rest of the world the defendant’s real level of 
culpability, and it would not confuse matters by hijacking the distinction 
between principals and accessories. The “new substantive offense” ap-
proach has been used in domestic criminal law before. For example, some 
jurisdictions solve the purpose-knowledge debate for complicity by crafting 
a new substantive offense for criminal facilitation—a less serious offense 
that only requires acting with knowledge.95 Similarly, German criminal law-
yers solve the problem of voluntary intoxication (should deliberately intox-
icated defendants be excused?) by crafting a special lesser offense for the 
commission of a crime while in a state of voluntary intoxication. 
The downside, however, is that such legislative solutions are unlikely in 
a system controlled by the Assembly of State Parties at the ICC—an insti-
tution unlikely to consider substantial revisions to the Special Part of the 
Rome Statute. That being said, some legislative amendment is surely re-
quired if and when AWS (and their associated war crimes) become a reality. 
The amendments proposed above represent relatively modest changes that 
should garner support. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The basic structure of international criminal law is already well-suited to 
prosecuting military commanders for deployment of an AWS that commits 
a war crime.96 The metaphor of deploying an organized “machine” to per-
petrate an international crime is deeply embedded in the founding DNA of 
international criminal law. In its more modern instantiations, the doctrine 
of indirect perpetration would allow an international court to prosecute a 
military commander for using an AWS as an instrument of criminality, in 
analogous fashion to the deployment of a hierarchical apparatus of power 
for the same purpose. Moreover, the doctrine applies regardless of whether 
the physical perpetrator of the criminal act is culpable or not, thus making 
                                                                                                                      
95. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115 (McKinney 1967) (substantive offense of criminal 
facilitation). 
96. Indeed, the appropriate question is how to produce a system of regulation that is 
“coherent and practical.” See Anderson, Reisner & Waxman, Adapting the Law, supra note 
66. See also Sassóli, supra note 93, at 338 (“I assume even autonomous weapon systems 
with artificial intelligence, though capable of learning, cannot do what the human beings 
who created them do not want them to do—or that it is at least possible to limit their au-
tonomy in this regard. Such must be the case because they are not addressees of the law.”). 
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it largely irrelevant whether the AWS qualifies as an autonomous agent 
with moral responsibility. This is an important development because I have 
stressed that an AWS might become so sophisticated that opposing com-
batants will have to take the “combatant’s stance” in order to understand it, 
predict its next move and defeat it on the battlefield. But the removal of 
the innocent instrumentality rule would still permit the prosecution of 
commanders as indirect perpetrators. Unfortunately, the one area where 
international criminal law is still ill-suited for the task is its inadequate 
treatment of crimes of recklessness. There are multiple reasons to solve the 
problem of recklessness, many of which have nothing to do with AWS, but 
we should not need another motivation to get the doctrine right. In cases 
where a military commander is reckless in his or her deployment of an 
AWS, the law should be carefully calibrated to express his or her exact level 
of culpability—not more and not less. 
 
 
